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Abstract
In game theory, the notion of a player’s beliefs about the game
players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs arises naturally. In this pa-
per, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory
which shows that completely modeling players’ epistemic beliefs and
assumptions is impossible. Furthermore, we introduce an interactive
temporal assumption logic to give an appropriate formalization of the
new paradox. Formalizing the new paradox in this logic shows that
there is no complete interactive temporal assumption model.
Keywords: Non-Self-Referential Paradox · Brandenburger-Keisler Para-
dox · Yablo’s Paradox · Temporal Assumption Logic · Interactive Mod-
els.
1 Introduction
In 2006 Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler presented a two-person
and self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory [4]. They show that
the following configuration of beliefs can not be represented: Ann believes
that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. The
Brandenburger-Keisler paradox (BK paradox) shows impossibility of com-
pletely modeling players’ epistemic beliefs and assumptions. Brandenburger
and Keisler present a modal logic interpretation of the paradox [4]. They
introduce two modal operators intended to represent the agents’ beliefs and
assumptions. In [15] Pacuit approaches the BK paradox from a modal logical
perspective and presents a detailed investigation of the paradox in neighbor-
hood models and hybrid systems. In particular, he shows that the paradox
can be seen as a theorem of an appropriate hybrid logic.
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The BK paradox is essentially a self-referential paradox and similarly to
any other paradox of the same kind can be analyzed from a category theoret-
ical or algebraic point of view. In [1] Abramsky and Svesper analyze the BK
paradox in categorical context. They present the paradox as a fixed-point
theorem, which can be carried out in any regular category, and show how it
can be reduced to a relational form of the one-person diagonal argument due
to Lawvere [13] where he gave a simple form of the (one-person) diagonal
argument as a fixed-point lemma in a very general setting.
Başkent in [2] approaches the BK paradox from two different perspec-
tives: non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic. He shows that
the paradox persists in both frameworks for category-theoretical reasons,
but with different properties. Başkent makes the connection between self-
referentiality and paraconsistency.
On the other hand, Stephen Yablo [19] introduced a logical paradox in
1993 that is similar to the liar paradox where he used an infinite sequence of
statements. Every statement in the sequence refers to the truth values of the
later statements. Therefore, it seems this paradox avoids self–reference. In
this paper, we present a non-self-referential multi-agent paradox in epistemic
game theory which we call “Yablo–like Brandenburger-Keisler paradox”.
In an interactive temporal assumption logic we study interactive rea-
soning: how agents reason about the beliefs of other agents over time. In
this paper, we introduce an interactive temporal assumption logic to give an
appropriate formalization of the Yablo–like Brandenburger-Keisler paradox.
2 Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox
Brandenburger and Keisler introduced the following two person Russell-style
paradox [2,4,15]. Beliefs and assumptions are two main concepts involved in
the statement of the paradox. An assumption is the strongest belief. Suppose
there are two players, Ann and Bob, and consider the following description
of beliefs:
Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes
that Bob’s assumption is wrong.
A paradox arises when one asks the question “Does Ann believe that Bob’s
assumption is wrong?” Suppose that answer to the above question is “yes”.
Then according to Ann, Bob’s assumption is wrong. But, according to Ann,
Bob’s assumption is Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. How-
ever, since the answer to the above question is “yes”, Ann believes that this
assumption is correct. So Ann does not believe that Bob’s assumption is
wrong. Therefore, the answer to the above question must be “no”. Thus, it
is not the case that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. Hence
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Ann believes Bob’s assumption is correct. That is, it is correct that Ann
believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. So, the answer must have been
“yes”. This is a contradiction!
Brandenburger and Keisler [4] introduce belief models for two players to
present their impossibility results. In a belief model, each player has a set
of states, and each state for one player has beliefs about the states of the
other player. We assume the reader is familiar with the belief models and
formulation of BK paradox in modal logic, but for the sake of accessibility,
we list the main notations, definitions and theorems which will be referred
to later on. For more details, we refer the reader to [4, 15].
Definition 1. A belief model is a two-sorted structure
M = (Ua, U b, P a, P b, ...)
where Ua and U b are the nonempty universe sets (for the two sorts), P a is
a proper subset of Ua × U b, P b is a proper subset of U b × Ua, and P a, P b
are serial, that is, the sentences
∀x∃y P a(x, y) and ∀y∃x P b(y, x)
hold. To simplify notation, x is always a variable of sort Ua and y is a
variable of sort U b. The members of Ua and U b are called states for Ann
and Bob, respectively. P a and P b are called possibility relations. We say
x believes a set Y ⊆ U b if {y : P a(x, y)} ⊆ Y , and x assumes Y if
{y : P a(x, y)} = Y . ⊕⊗
For an arbitrary structure N = (Ua, U b, P a, P b, ...), by the first order
language for N we mean the two-sorted first order logic with sorts for Ua
and U b and symbols for the relations in the vocabulary of N . Given a first
order formula ϕ(u) whose only free variable is u, the set defined by ϕ in N
is the set {u : ϕ(u) is true in N}. In general, by a language for N we will
mean a subset of the set of all formulas of the first order language for N .
Given a language L for N , we let La, Lb be the families of all subsets of
Ua, U b respectively which are defined by formulas in L. Also, The diagonal
formula D(x) is the first order formula
∀y (P a(x, y)→ ¬P b(y, x)).
This is the formal counterpart to the intuitive statement: “Ann believes that
Bob’s assumption is wrong.”
Definition 2. Let M be a belief model, and let L be a language for it. The
model M is complete for L if each nonempty set Y ∈ Lb is assumed by
some x ∈ Ua, and each nonempty X ∈ La is assumed by some y ∈ U
b. ⊕⊗
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In their paper [4], Brandenburger and Keisler prove that there is no belief
model which is complete for a language L which contains the tautologically
true formulas, D(x), ∀y P b(y, x) and formula built from the formal counter-
part of the BK paradox.
They also present modal formulations of the BK paradox by present-
ing a specific modal logic, called interactive assumption logic, with two
modal operators for “belief” and “assumption”. For semantical interpreta-
tions Brandenburger and Keisler use Kripke models [4]. Pacuit [15] presents
a detailed investigation of the BK paradox in neighborhood models and in
hybrid systems. He shows that the paradox can be seen as a theorem of an
appropriate hybrid logic.
3 Yablo’s Paradox
To counter a general belief that all the paradoxes stem from a kind of circu-
larity (or involve some self–reference, or use a diagonal argument) Stephen
Yablo designed a paradox in 1993 that seemingly avoided self–reference
[18,19]. Since then much debate has been sparked in the philosophical com-
munity as to whether Yablo’s Paradox is really circular–free or involves some
circularity (at least hidden or implicitly); see e.g. [3, 5–7, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20].
Unlike the liar paradox, which uses a single sentence, this paradox applies an
infinite sequence of statements. There is no consistent way to assign truth
values to all the statements, although no statement directly refers to itself.
Yablo considers the following sequence of sentences {Si}:
S1 : ∀k > 1; Sk is untrue,
S2 : ∀k > 2; Sk is untrue,
S3 : ∀k > 3; Sk is untrue,
...
The paradox follows from the following deductions. Suppose S1 is true. Then
for any k > 1, Sk is not true. Specially, S2 is not true. Also, Sk is not true
for any k > 2. But this is exactly what S2 says, hence S2 is true after all.
Contradiction! Suppose then that S1 is false. This means that there is a
k > 1 such that Sk is true. But we can repeat the reasoning, this time with
respect to Sk and reach a contradiction again. No matter whether we assume
S1 to be true or false, we reach a contradiction. Hence the paradox. Yablo’s
paradox can be viewed as a non-self-referential liar’s paradox; it has been
used to give alternative proof for Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem [8,14].
Recently in [9,10], formalization of Yablo’s paradox and its different versions
in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) yield genuine theorems in this logic.
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4 A Non-Self-Referential Paradox
in Epistemic Game Theory
In this section, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game
theory. Unlike the BK paradox which uses one single statement on belief
and assumption of agents, this paradox consists of two sequences of players
(or agents) and a sequence of statements of agent’s belief and assumptions.
Indeed, this paradox shows that not every configuration of agents’ beliefs
and assumptions can be represented. Let us consider two infinite sequence
of players {Ai} and {Bi}, with the following description of beliefs:
A1 B1
A2 B2
A3 B3
...
...
For all i, Ai believes that Bi assumes that
for all j > i, Aj believes that Bj’s assumption is wrong.
A paradox arises when one asks the question “Does A1 believe that B1’s
assumption is wrong?”
Suppose that the answer to the above question is “no”. Thus, it is not the
case that A1 believes that B1’s assumption is wrong. Hence A1 believes B1’s
assumption is correct. That is, it is correct that for all j > 1, Aj believes
that Bj ’s assumption is wrong. Specially, A2 believes that B2’s assumption
is wrong. On the other hand, since for all j > 2, Aj believes that Bj ’s
assumption is wrong, one can conclude that A2 believes B2’s assumption is
correct. Therefore, at the same time A2 believes that B2’s assumption is
both correct and wrong. This is a contradiction!
If the answer to the above question is “yes”. Then according to A1, B1’s
assumption is wrong. But, according to A1, B1’s assumption is that “for all
j > 1, Aj believes that Bj ’s assumption is wrong”. Thus, there is k > 1 for
which Ak believes that Bk’s assumption is correct. Now we can apply the
same reasoning we used before about Ak and Bk to reach the contradiction!
Hence the paradox. This paradox is a non-self-referential multi-agent version
of the BK paradox.
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5 Interactive Temporal Assumption Logic
In this section, we introduce an Interactive Temporal Assumption Logic
(iTAL) to present an appropriate formulation of the non-self-referential Yablo-
like BK paradox. The interactive temporal assumption language LiTAL con-
tains individual propositional symbols, the propositional connectives, the
linear-time operators #,2,♦ and the epistemic operators “Believe” and “As-
sumption”: for each pair of players ij among Ann and Bob, the operator Bij
will be beliefs for player i about j, and Aij is the assumption for i about j.
In words, Bijφ means that the agent i believes φ about j, and Aijφ is that
the agent i assumes φ about agent j. The temporal operators ◦,2, and ♦
are called next time, always (or henceforth), and sometime (or eventuality)
operators, respectively. Formulas #ϕ, 2ϕ, and ♦ϕ are typically read “next
ϕ”, “always ϕ”, and “sometime ϕ”. We note that ♦ϕ ≡ ¬2¬ϕ.
Definition 3. Formulas in LiTAL are defined as follows:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | # φ | 2φ | Bijφ | Aijφ ⊕⊗
For semantical interpretations we introduce an appropriate class of Kripke
models.
Definition 4. An iTAL-Model is a Kripke structure
W = (W,N, {Pn : n ∈ N}, U
a, U b, V ),
whereW is nonempty set, N is the set of natural numbers, for each n ∈ N, Pn
is a binary relation Pn ⊆ W × W and U
a, U b are disjoint sets such that
(Ua, U b, P an , P
b
n) is a belief model, where U
a ∪ U b =W, P an = Pn ∩U
a × U b,
and P bn = Pn ∩ U
b × Ua. V : Prop→ 2N×W is a function mapping to each
propositional letter p the subset V (p) of Cartesian product N ×W . Indeed,
V (p) is the set of pairs (n,w) such that p is true in the world w at the
moment n. ⊕⊗
The satisfiability of a formula ϕ ∈ LiTAL in a model W, at a moment of
time n ∈ N in a world w ∈ W , denoted by Wwn  ϕ (in short; (n,w)  ϕ ),
is defined inductively as follows:
• (n,w)  p⇐⇒ (n,w) ∈ V (p) for p ∈ Prop,
• (n,w)  ¬ϕ⇐⇒ (n,w) 6 ϕ,
• (n,w)  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ (n,w)  ϕ and (n,w)  ψ,
• (n,w)  #ϕ⇐⇒ (n+ 1, w)  ϕ,
• (n,w)  2ϕ⇐⇒ ∀m ≥ n (m,w)  ϕ,
• (n,w)  Bijϕ⇔ (n,w)  Uc∧∀z[(Pn(w, z)∧(n, z)  U
d)→ (n, z)  ϕ]),
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• (n,w)  Aijϕ⇔ (n,w)  Uc∧∀z[(Pn(w, z)∧ (n, z)  U
d)↔ (n, z)  ϕ]).
Let x has sort Ua, y has sort U b and ϕ is a statement about y. Intuitively,
(n, x)  Babϕ says that “in time n, x believes ϕ(y)”, and (n, x)  Aabϕ says
that “in time n, x assumes ϕ(y)”. A formula is valid for V in W if it is
true at all w ∈ W , and satisfiable for V in W if it is true at some w ∈ W .
In an interactive assumption model W, we will always suppose that D is a
propositional symbol, and V is a valuation in W such that V (D) is the set
D =
{
(n, x) ∈W × N : (∀y ∈W )[Pn(x, y)→ ¬Pn(y, x)]
}
.
In the rest of paper, we present our formulation of the non-self-referential
Yablo-like BK paradox in the interactive temporal assumption setting. The
thought is that we can make progress by thinking of the sequences of agents
in Yablo-like BK paradox not as infinite families of agents but as a two in-
dividual agents that their belief and assumption can be evaluated in lots of
times (temporal states) in an epistemic temporal model. Thus, the emer-
gence of the Yablo-like BK paradox should be the same as the derivability
of a particular formula in the epistemic temporal logic.
Let us have a closer look at the Yablo-like BK paradox:
For all i, Ai believes that Bi assumes that
for all j > i, Aj believes that Bj’s assumption is wrong.
Now suppose that there are two players, namely Ann and Bob. Assume
that Ai and Bi are the counterparts of Ann and Bob in the i
th temporal
state. Then infinitely many statements in the Yablo-like BK paradox can be
represented in just one single formula using temporal tools:
2
[
Ann believes that Bob assumes that
(
#2(Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong)
)]
The interpretation of above formula in English can be seen as: “Always it
is the case that Ann believes that Bob assumes from the next time henceforth
that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong”. We note that Ann and
Bob in each state refer to their belief and assumptions in the next temporal
states; not the state that they are in.
Theorem 1. In an interactive temporal assumption model W, if 2(AabUb)
is satisfiable, then
2
[
BabAba(#2D)
]
−→ 2D
is valid in W.
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Proof. Since 2(AabUb) is satisfiable, there exist k ∈ N and x˜ ∈W for which
(k, x˜)  2(AabUb). This means that ∀l ≥ k (l, x˜)  AabUb. So, for all
l ≥ k, (l, x˜)  Ua ∧ ∀y [P al (x˜, y) ∧ (l, y)  U
b ↔ (l, y)  Ub]. Thus
∀l ≥ k (l, x˜)  Ua ∧ ∀y [P al (x˜, y)]. (1)
Assume (k, x˜)  2
[
BabAba(#2D)
]
; we show that (k, x˜)  2D. To this end,
for a moment, suppose that (k, x˜) 6 2D. So, there is m ≥ k for which
(m, x˜) 6 D. We can assume that m = k. Thus, (k, x˜)  ¬D which means
that ∃y˜ [P ak (x˜, y˜) ∧ P
b
k(y˜, x˜)]. By (1) for l = k, (k, x˜)  U
a ∧ ∀y [P ak (x˜, y)].
Since (k, x˜)  2
[
BabAba(#2D)
]
, then
∀l ≥ k (l, x˜)  BabAba(#2D)
=⇒ ∀l ≥ k (l, x˜)  Ua ∧ ∀y[P al (x˜, y) ∧ (l, y)  U
b → (l, y)  Aba(#2D)]
=⇒ ∀l ≥ k ∀y (l, y)  Aba(#2D)
=⇒ ∀l ≥ k ∀y
(
(l, y)  Ub ∧ ∀w [P bl (y,w) ∧ (l, w)  U
a ↔ (l, w)  #2D]
)
.
Therefore, since P bk(y˜, x˜), one can conclude that (k, x˜)  #2D. So, we
have ∀l≥ k + 1 (k, x˜)  #2D, thus ∀l≥ k + 1 [P al (x˜, y˜) → ¬P
b
l (y˜, x˜)]. In
particular, for k+1, P ak+1(x˜, y˜)→ ¬P
b
k+1(y˜, x˜). By (1), since P
a
k+1(x˜, y˜) then
¬P bk+1(y˜, x˜). On the other hand, since (k + 1, x˜)  #2D, then P
b
k+1(y˜, x˜)
which is a contradiction! Therefore, (k, x˜)  2D which shows that
2
[
BabAba(#2D)
]
−→ 2D
is valid in W. ⊠⊞
Theorem 2. In any interactive temporal assumption model W, the formula
¬2
[
BabAba(Ua ∧#2D)
]
is valid.
Proof. If not, then (k, x˜)  2
[
BabAba(#2D)
]
for some sate (k, x˜). By
Theorem 1, (k, x˜)  2D so ∀l ≥ k, (l, x˜)  D, in particular for l = k.
Thus, ∀y [P ak (x˜, y) → ¬P
b
k(y, x˜)]. On the other hand, (k, x˜)  B
abAbaUa.
By the definitions of Bab and Aba on Ua, there is some y˜ such that the
relation [P ak (x˜, y˜)∧P
b
k(y˜, x˜)] holds. So, (k, x˜)  ¬D which is a contradiction!
Therefore, ¬2
[
BabAba(Ua ∧#2D)
]
is valid in W. ⊠⊞
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6 Conclusions
In game theory, the notion of a player’s beliefs about the game player’s
beliefs about other players’ beliefs arises naturally. We presented a non-
self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which we called “Yablo-like
Brandenburger-Keisler paradox”. Arising the paradox shows that completely
modeling the players’ epistemic beliefs and assumptions is impossible. We
formalized Yablo-like Brandenburger-Keisler paradox in the interactive tem-
poral assumption logic and showed that there is no complete model for the
set of all modal formulas built from Ua,Ub and D.
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